February 2026

The Bombay High Court held that once a competent authority determines adequacy of stamp duty on an instrument, such determination attains legal finality if not challenged through prescribed statutory procedures within limitation.

The Court found that the State cannot reopen a concluded stamp duty determination beyond the six-year limitation period under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. It also clarified that statutory powers assigned to a particular authority must be exercised only by that authority and cannot be assumed by another officer merely because such officer is superior in hierarchy.

The Court quashed the recovery order as being both time-barred and without jurisdiction.

The Bombay High Court held that revenue authorities acting under Sections 149 and 150 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 have limited jurisdiction. Their function is confined to updating revenue records for fiscal and administrative purposes.

The Court clarified that mutation entries do not create, extinguish, or decide title. Revenue authorities cannot adjudicate complex questions of ownership, testamentary succession, validity of a civil court decree, or the enforceability of registered documents.

Where a mutation claim is based on a registered consent decree of a competent civil court, the revenue authorities are required to give effect to it for limited mutation purposes and cannot sit in appeal over the decree.

The Bombay High Court held that while executing a decree passed by a foreign court in a reciprocating territory under Section 44A CPC, the Indian executing court is not required in every case to frame issues and permit oral evidence.

The Court explained that proceedings under Section 44A CPC are intended to ensure swift enforcement of foreign decrees from notified reciprocating territories. The judgment debtor may raise objections under Section 13 CPC, but the burden lies on the judgment debtor to show that the foreign judgment falls within one of the statutory exceptions.

The Court clarified that such objections should ordinarily be assessed from pleadings, the foreign judgment, and the record of proceedings before the foreign court. Oral evidence should be permitted only in rare cases where factual controversy cannot be resolved otherwise.

The Delhi High Court held that where an establishment has branches in more than one state, the appropriate government under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is the Central Government. Therefore, gratuity authorities appointed by a State Government would lack jurisdiction in such cases.

The Court referred to Section 2(a) of the Payment of Gratuity Act and clarified that jurisdiction depends on the statutory definition of "appropriate government". If the establishment operates across multiple states, the matter falls within the authority of the Central Government.

The Supreme Court held that a bank's internal classification of a loan as a non-performing asset for accounting or provisioning purposes does not by itself determine the starting point of limitation under the IBC.

The Court observed that where the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged through fresh agreements, such acknowledgments may give the debt a fresh limitation period. The Court also held that balance sheets signed by a director may amount to acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

The Court further reaffirmed that once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and default above the statutory threshold has occurred, there is limited discretion to refuse admission of a Section 7 application.

The Supreme Court held that a person who purchases property from a judgment-debtor during pendency of proceedings has no locus to resist execution of a decree passed in favour of the judgment-creditor.

The Court applied the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It observed that allowing pendente lite purchasers to resist execution would encourage judgment-debtors to defeat decrees by transferring properties or creating third-party interests during litigation.

The Court rejected the purchaser's attempt to obstruct execution and held that the arbitral award/decree remained enforceable despite the subsequent sale transaction.

The Supreme Court held that telecom spectrum is a public resource and cannot be treated as an asset owned by telecom service providers for the purpose of insolvency proceedings.

The Court observed that spectrum is granted through a licence under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Such licence confers only a limited, conditional, and revocable right to use spectrum. It does not transfer ownership of spectrum to the telecom company.

The Court also clarified that mere recognition of spectrum usage rights as an intangible asset in a company's balance sheet does not determine legal ownership. A resolution professional cannot assume custody or control over spectrum as an asset of the corporate debtor unless the statutory and licence framework permits such transfer.